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A. Notice of Claims
There were only two cases reported during the survey period on
the subject of liability insurance. In the first of these, Rural Educa-
tion Ass'n, Inc. v. American Fire & Casualty Co.,1 the insured had
notice of an accident on the day it occurred. Suit for injuries growing
out of the accident was filed nearly seven months later, and not until
the day after suit was filed did the insured notify the insurer of the
accident. After judgment was obtained against it, the insured brought
the present suit against its insurer. The insurance policy required
that notice be given "as soon as practicable" following the accident.
The district court held that a delay of seven months constituted a
breach of this provision, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed. In the absence of excuse for the delay or of waiver by
the insurer, it is generally recognized that proper notice of claims is a
condition precedent to insurance coverage. 2 No circumstances were
shown in the present case to take it out of the general rule.
B. Subrogation
In the case of Vaughn v. Gill,3 the liability insurance carrier of a
tortfeasor sought, by subrogation, to recover contribution from an
alleged joint tortfeasor. While the case is of interest principally in its
discussion of the right of contribution,4 the Supreme Court held that
the original bill was defective 'in that it failed to state that it was
brought by or at the instance of the insurer. The apparent party com-
plainant was the named insured. In the body of the bill, however, was
an averment that a right of subrogation in favor of the company
existed and that the company "is subrogated" to the insured's rights.
The Supreme Court said, "There is no assertion that the bill was filed
at the direction of the Insurance Company, nor is there any allegation
in the bill that any one authorized to act for the Insurance Company
had exercised its right of subrogation under the policy."5
It is unfortunate that the court did not take this opportunity to
clarify the procedural problem as to the proper method of bringing
*Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue & Sturdivant,
Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 207 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1953).
2. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S.W
128 (1918)4 Foreman v. Union Indemnity Co., 12 Tenn. App. 89 (E.S. 1928).
3. 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1953).
4. See the Survey article on Torts, infra p. 951.
5. 264 S.W.2d at 807.
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subrogation suits in this state. Unlike the statutes in most of the
states, the Tennessee "real party in interest" statute" does not clearly
state how a suit brought by one person for the benefit of another
should be captioned.7 Many years ago the Supreme Court held that
a subrogation suit could be maintained by the insurer in the name of
the insured, and apparently it did not require that there be any aver-
ment as to the beneficial party in interest.8 There would seem to be
little doubt, however, that an insurer could bring such a suit in its
own name also, and likewise that the insurer could in any subrogation
suit be required to give bond for costs, even if it sued in the name of
its insured.9
The Supreme Court in the present case did not cite its earlier de-
cision; and its treatment of the matter was brief. The court apparently
disapproved of the practice of bringing a subrogation suit in the
name of the insured only, at least without a specific averment in the
pleadings as to the nature of the action. No authority of any sort was
cited, however, and the matter must still be regarded as being in
doubt. It is to be hoped that the court will clarify the point in the
6. TENN. CoDE Axmr. § 8619 (Williams 1934).
7. In cases involving assignments, it is generally considered that the
assignee may sue (1) in his own name, (2) in the name of the assignor, or
(3) in the name of the assignor for the use of the assignee. SeeCARUTHERS,
HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT 49-50 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951); HIGGINs & CROWNOVER,
TENNESSEE PROCEDURE IN LAW CASES §§ 334-36 (1936).
8. Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 35, 33 S.W. 615 (1896); Lancaster Mills v.
Merchants' Cotton-Press & Storage Co., 89 Tenn. 1, 58, 14 S.W. 317 (1890).
See also City of Nashville v. Mason, 7 Tenn. Civ. App. 444 (1917).
9. In most types of subrogation suits (partial losses being the principal
exception), the insurer would be the real party in interest and would con-
stitute "the real plaintiff of record" under TENN. CODE ANN. § 8619 (Williams
1934). As such the insurer would be liable for costs under TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 8620 (Williams 1934).
A problem of considerable importance in jury cases is whether the de-
fendant may show, either in qualifying the jury or by evidence, that the real
plaintiff is a subrogation carrier. Some of the circuit courts do not permit this
practice. The appellate courts do not appear to have considered the point in
Tennessee. Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 35, 33 S.W. 615 (1896) is not authority
forbidding the practice; the court in that case was dealing with the substantive
right of subrogation, not with matters of practice. It struck as insufficient a
plea that the plaintiff, who was the insured, had been compensated by in-
surance; no question was raised as to who was the real party in interest.
In Harriman & N.R.R. v. McCartty, 15 Tenn. App. 109, 113 (E.S. 1932), the
Court of Appeals held that it was improper to ask a plaintiff how much fire
insurance he carried. The reasons stated, however, were that such testimony
did not bear on the value of the property destroyed, and that payment to the
plaintiff by an insurer did not bar a suit by him on behalf of the insurer. The
opinion does not reveal whether in fact the plaintiff was so suing, and the
matter of identifying the real party in interest does not seem to have been
raised. In view of the wording of TENN. CODE ANw. § 8619 (Williams 1934)
it would seem proper to permit a defendant to show to a jury that the suit
is brought by an insurer, for the purpose of ascertaining whether any jurors
had an interest in "the real plaintiff of record." In many of the other states
having "real party in interest" statutes, subrogation actions are required to be
brought directly in the name of the insurer, so that the problem here stated




future, or that the legislature will make the "real party in interest"
statute more explicit.
II. Fn, THEFT AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
A. Fire Insurance
In the case of Frederick v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 0 the Court
of Appeals reviewed a jury verdict in favor of the insured on a fire
insurance policy. Proof of loss had been filed with the company fol-
lowing the fire. Thereafter the company had the insured examined
under oath as to the circumstances surrounding the loss. When the
company later denied liability, the insured sued, and the company
defended on the ground that the insured either burned the property
herself or had it burned. Conflicting testimony was introduced at the
trial as to the circumstances under which the fire occurred. The trial
court set aside one jury verdict for the insured, but approved a second
such verdict. The Court of Appeals held that there was ample evidence
to show that the insured did not burn the property and that she was
not present when the fire occurred. It accordingly affirmed the ver-
dict.
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed an award by the jury
of a statutory penalty.-- The property which burned was subject to
a mortgage, and the fire policy contained a standard mortgage clause.
Interest on the mortgage continued to accrue after the fire, and the
insured was accordingly faced with an increasing interest liability
because of the company's refusal to pay on the policy. She had been
forced to incur legal expenses and other costs also because of this
refusal, and the Court of Appeals held that under these circumstances,
the penalty could properly be awarded by the jury. 2
An interesting case dealing with waiver and estoppel was decided
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ten-
nessee.13 In this case a policy of fire insurance on vehicles and equip-
ment was issued by the company's agent five days before the applica-
tion for the policy was filled out. The agent was not a licensed fire
insurance broker. After delivering the policy, he interviewed the in-
sured and obtained information for the application from him, making
pencil notes thereon. The insured signed the form, and the agent
later filled in the blanks in type, leaving his pencilled notes on the
face of the application. Many of the typed answers were supported
10. 259 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6434 (Williams 1934).
12. The penalty is allowed only if the court or jury finds that the insurer's
failure to pay was in bad faith, and, in addition, that the insured has sustained
additional loss or expense by the delay. The amount of the penalty is measured
by such additional expenses and damages, up to a maximum of 25% of the
policy proceeds.
13. Trantham v. Canal Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
1954]
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by no pencil notes, and some of the pencilled entries were unintel-
ligible even to the agent, who testified on the trial.
Eight months after the application was received by the company,
the insured sustained a fire loss. The company for the first time then
asserted that the application contained misrepresentations which
vitiated the policy. The company insisted that it relied on the applica-
tion, not in issuing the policy, but in refraining from cancelling the
same, alleging that it would have cancelled the policy had the applica-
tion revealed the truth about certain prior losses of the insured. There
was testimony in the record, however, that the soliciting agent knew
the true facts concerning such losses when he filled out the applica-
tion.
The district court very properly held that the company was estopped
from asserting this defense, and that it had, by leaving the crudely-
drawn application on file without inquiry for eight months, waived
any right to question its contents. The condition of the application was
sufficient. to put the insurer on inquiry, and it was chargeable with
knowledge of facts which such inquiry would have revealed, as well
as with any knowledge which its agent may have had concerning the
true facts.'4
B. Theft Insurance
One of the most striking decisions on insurance during the survey
period was that of the Supreme Court in American Indemnity Co. v.
Southern Missionary College.Y1
In December 1950, the insurer issued to the college, a religious non-
profit institution, a policy indemnifying it against "direct" losses from
robbery or safe burglary occurring on its premises. The college con-
ducted several mercantile enterprises for the benefit of its students and
faculty, including a college bookstore. In July 1951, a subsidiary cor-
poration for profit was organized to operate these mercantile enter-
prises. All of its stock was taken by the college, which in turn de-
livered to the subsidiary all of the assets of the bookstore and the
other commercial ventures. The officers of the two corporations were
identical. No change was made in the theft policy mentioned above.
In July 1952, the bookstore suffered a large burglary loss. The
14. See Hayes & Sons v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 194 Tenn. 35 250 S.W.2d 7
(1952), discussed in the 1953 Survey, 6 V.=. L. Rsv. 1073-74 (1953) (knowl-
edge of automobile agency as to actual use of vehicle imputed to insurer
where agency solicited application). Had the agent been a licensed fire
insurance broker in the principal case, the exception in TEwx. CODS ANx.
§ 6087 (Williams 1934) would have been applicable, and the broker's knowl-
edge would not have been imputed to the insurer; this section makes the
broker the agent of the applicant for insurance. All other soliciting agents are
made the agents of the insurance company in all matters pertaining to the
application and the policy.
15. 195 Tenn. 513, 260 S.W.2d 269 (1953).
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college insisted that the theft policy was applicable to the loss, and in
its original bill filed in the case there was an averment that the col-
lege had sustained a burglary loss on its premises. The insurer de-
murred on the grounds that the bookstore was owned by the sub-
sidiary, an entirely different entity from the college, and that the
policy did not cover this subsidiary and was not issued to it. The
chancellor overruled this demurrer but permitted an appeal from his
ruling.
In a split decision, four members of the Supreme Court sustained
the chancellor's ruling and held the demurrer insufficient. The major-
ity opinion stated that the two corporations were "practically indis-
tinguishable" except in name,16 and that the parent stockholder had
an insurable interest in the property of its subsidiary which was
stolen. The court "pierced the corporate veil" and held the insurer
liable. The dissenting opinion insisted that no property owned by the
insured college had been taken, and that while the college did have
an insurable interest in the stolen property, it had not insured that
interest. The loss was that of the owner of the property, which was
the subsidiary, and there was no "direct" loss to the insured.
Insofar as the demurrer was concerned, the result reached may have
been proper, since the original bill alleged a direct loss to the insured.
This allegation was admitted by the demurrer for the purpose of test-
ing the sufficiency of the pleadings, and for that reason the demurrer
may not have been well taken.'7 The demurrer also appears to have
alleged new facts and to have been defective as a "speaking" de-
murrer 16
The majority opinion, however, was not based on the pleadings but
on the merits. Its rationale has received critical comment 9 for the
court apparently failed to differentiate between two entirely different
problems. The question of whether the college had an insurable-
interest in the subsidiary's property was not raised by the insurance
company. The insurer admitted that the college did have such an
interest, and the point is well settled that a parent corporation, being
a stockholder, does have an insurable interest in the property of a
subsidiary.20 The parent has no title or ownership in such property,
however. The question of whether the college owned the stolen prop-
erty and sustained a "direct" loss by its theft presented an entirely
different problem from that of insurable interest, and the Court left
unanswered the insurer's contention that its policy was simply not
16. 195 Tenn. at 519, 260 S.W.2d at 272.
17. GIBsoN, Surns nx CHA cEsY §§ 301-04 (4th ed., Higgins & Crownover,
1937).
18. GxasoN, Sunfs in CHANCERY § 307 (4th Ed., Higgins & Crownover, 1937).
19. 22 TENN. L. REv. 234 (1954)..
20. Donaldson v. Sun Mut. Insurance Co., 95 Tenn. 280, 32 S.W. 251 (1895).
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issued to the subsidiary but to the parent and did not cover this loss.
- The real controversy in the case would appear to have been, not one
of insurable interest, but of the scope of coverage of the policy.
In another case dealing with theft coverage,2 ' an insurer sought
to avoid liability on a fidelity policy on the ground that the employer
to whom the policy was issued had knowledge of prior defalcations
by the employee. It is clear that the employer would have had a duty
to the insurer to reveal this information if he possessed it. 22 The case,
therefore, simply presented a factual issue as to whether the employer
did have such knowledge. From the testimony, the district court had
found in favor of the employer, and the Court of Appeals held that
there was substantial evidence to support this ruling.
C. Casualty Insurance
In the interesting case of Gillespie v. Federal Compress & Ware-
house Co. 2 3 minority stockholders of a large cotton warehousing com-
pany launched a general attack on the company's insurance program.
One major point of attack was that the company carried insurance on
goods in transit, thereby assuming a risk which it was not obligated
to incur. The stockholders also alleged that the company was carry-
ing flood insurance with a company whose assets were insufficient to
cover the risk.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in any of the various con-
tentions of the stockholders. The warehousing company as bailee
clearly had an insurable interest in the property and could insure its
full value on behalf of the owners.24 It was also held to have an in-
terest in the goods in transit, particularly in view of the fact that
losses often occurred under circumstances making it impossible to de-
termine whether they occurred in transit or in the warehouse, and the
company was entitled to protect itself on such claims. By statute, it
was authorized to carry insurance, 25 so that its program was not ultra
vires, as claimed by the stockholders.
Although the primary insurer was a small company, the court
pointed out that it had reinsured the flood risk, which was substantial,
with foreign insurance companies. In the reinsuring agreements, these
companies agreed to submit to jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts,
and the reinsurance was made available directly to the company.
Without such provisions, of course, the insurers would have been
21. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Banks-Olshine Co., 207 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1953).
22. Herbert v. Lee, 118 Tenn. 133, 101 S.W. 175, 121 Am. St. Rep. 989 (1906).
23. 265 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
24. Lancaster Mills v. Merchants' Cotton-Press & Storage Co., 89 Tenn. 1,
45, 14 S.W. 317 (1890).
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 3831 (Williams 1934).
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liable only to the primary insurer.2 6 Under all of the circumstances,
the court rejected the criticism of the complainants.
III. DiSABniLTY AND HEALTH
Of considerable interest is the case of King v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of New York 27 decided by the Northern Division of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District. The action grew out of refusal
by the insurer to pay monthly disability benefits claimed to be due
under a policy providing for same in the event of total permanent
disability. The defendant moved to strike three counts of the com-
plaint. The first count sued for accrued monthly benefits together
with interest, the Tennessee statutory penalty, plus a refund of
premiums paid since commencement of disability. No attack was made
upon this count. The second count asked for a decree of specific per-
formance requiring the defendant to pay future monthly benefits as
they became due ani enjoining defendant from requiring plaintiff to
attend physical examinations outside his home county and from re-
quiring more than one annual examination. The third count sought
to recover the present value of all future benefits including a death
benefit, the recovery to be based upon the life expectancy of the in-
sured. Apparently this count alleged a breach of the whole policy and
a repudiation by defendant. However, it does not appear that it was
alleged that the company had gone further than to deny that the
defendant was disabled as claimed. The fourth count sought to rescind
the entire contract and recover all premiums paid since the issuance of
the policy, together with interest. The defendant moved to strike the
second, third and fourth counts or in the alternative for summary
judgments thereon. The court granted the motion to strike. It was
recognized that under the Code of Tennessee, the insurance policy
was to be treated as a Tennessee contract and governed by Tennessee
law,2 8 and the Erie Railroad29 doctrine was noted. The motion as to
the second count was granted upon the grounds that to permit the
relief sought therein would require the court to remake the contract
entered into between the parties. In sustaining the motion as to
counts three and four, the court gave a common reason and also an
additional reason as to each of them. The common reason assigned
was that the Tennessee penalty statute" impliedly furnishes the ex-
clusive remedy in such cases and by inference excludes allowance of
damages for anticipatory breach sought in count three, and also the
relief upon a theory of rescission as sought in count four. More sig-
nificantly, the court points out that no Tennessee case was found
26. Ruohs v. Traders' Fire Ins. Co., 111 Tenn. 405, 78 S.W. 85 (1903).
27. 114 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6086 (Williams 1934).
29. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6434 (Williams, 1934), note 12 supra.
1954 ]
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which treated a contract of this sort as an entire contract; but rather
the Tennessee Supreme Court3' has indicated that the causes of action
for failure to make periodic payments are severable. Accordingly, the
doctrine of anticipatory breach was held not to apply. In this reason-
ing, the court is clearly supported by the overwhelming weight of
authority.3 2
The additional reason assigned for granting the motion as to count
four was simply that there was no basis for inferring that there was
any fraud in the inception of the contract and that the allegations
failed to make out a case for rescission.
It accordingly appears that the court was correct in the conclusions
reached and that the separate reasons assigned in support of his action
as to counts three and four are sound. However, there would seem
to be some question as to the soundness of the common reason. The
Tennessee statute, permitting the imposition of a penalty where the
refusal to pay is in bad faith, is simply a penal tatute; on principle
good faith or bad faith should have nothing to do with the legal ques-
tions as to whether or not such a contract is entire or severable, or
whether or not facts justifying a rescission are made out.
Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Boss 3 simply follows the general rule
that where a loss is within the general coverage provisions of a policy
of insurance the burden of proof is upon the insurer who seeks to
avoid liability under an exception contained therein. On November
6, 1950, the insurer had issued a health policy covering plaintiff, his
wife and daughter. The plaintiff's wife underwent an operation on
June 9, 1951, and this suit was for medical expenses in connection
therewith. Among the expenses which the insurer agreed to pay
were those of any surgical operation "resulting from sickness . . . if
the operation is performed after this policy has been in effect for six
months or more from the date hereof." The insurer sought to deny
liability under a provision of the policy exempting it from liability
31. Atkinson v. Railroad Employees' Mutual Relief Society, 160 Tenn. 158,
22 S.W.2d 631 (1929).
32. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11255 (1947); Notes, 81 A.L.R.
379 (1932), 99 A.L.R. 1171 (1935). It is interesting that among the cases
indicating a contrary view is the case of Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Rascoe,
12 F.2d 693 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 273 U.S. 722, (1926), which case was initially
tried in the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. This case
over a convincing dissent, held that such a contract was a single contract and
affirmed the overruling of a demurrer to an amended declaration that sought
the present value of future disability benefits based upon life expectancy of
the insured. The opinion was severely limited, if not overruled, by subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court in Mobley v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
295 U.S. 632, 55 Sup. Ct. 867, 79 L. Ed. 1166 (1935), and in New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 56 Sup. Ct. 615, 80 L. Ed. 971 (1935).
Moreover, most of the cases in apparent disagreement with the above have
found special facts amounting to an actual repudiation as distinguished from
a simple denial that the insured is disabled within the meaning of the policy.
33. 264 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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where the disease occasioning the expenses originated before 'the
policy had been in effect for 15 days. The case had been tried below
on an appeal from the court of general sessions, without a jury and
the circuit court had affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. The Court
of Appeals held that the defendant had failed to carry the burden of
proof imposed upon it and accordingly affirmed.
In Gibbons v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association,3
the significant question was one of tender. The company had issued
a sickness and accident policy which provided for payments of $100
per month if the insured became totally disabled. A few months after
issuance, the insured filed proof of disability. The company denied
liability on the ground of fraud in procurement of the policy and ten-
dered the premium received by it. The insured further alleged that
subsequently an agent of the company stated to him that there was
absolutely no liability on the policy but offered him $500 in full settle-
ment of all claims against the company. The insured accepted this
money and executed a release. This bill was filed in the chancery
court alleging that the agent's statements of no liability were false
and fraudulent and that the settlement offer was accepted because the
insured was uneducated and sick. The relief sought was that the
settlement be declared void and the insurer be required to pay ac-
cording to the provisions of the policy. The bill also alleged that the
company under the policy owed the complainant more than the $500
previously paid to him and asked that said sum be credited against-
the judgment to be rendered. The company filed a demurrer to the
bill upon the grounds that a repayment or tender of the $500 was a
prerequisite to the maintenance of the suit. The chancellor sustained
the demurrer, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The allegation in
the bill that the company was indebted to complainant in excess of
$500 failed to meet the requirement of tender in that such allegation
only stated a conclusion of the pleader which was not admitted by
a demurrer. While previous Tennessee cases,3 5 requiring that one who
seeks to avoid an accord or satisfaction agreement on the ground that
it was attained by fraud must tender back the money received under
the executed agreement, have been based upon a claim ex delicto, the
court concluded that there is no reason in principle why a different
rule should be applied where the claim is ex contractu.
In Berryhill v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association, 6
(two cases) there was presented the question as to the duty imposed
upon an insurance applicant to read the application which had been
incorrectly completed by the insurance agent. Two suits had been
34. 195 Tenn. 339, 259 S.W.2d 653 (1953).
35. See Glover v. Louisville & N.R.R., 163 Tenn. 85, 40 S.W.2d 1031 (1931).
36. 262 S.W.2d 878 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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filed, one upon a sickness and accident policy and the other upon a
hospital and medical benefit policy. The plaintiff had previously had
some physical troubles, which had cleared up and it was his position
that he advised the agent thereof but the agent had not so disclosed in
filling out the application, but, on the contrary, had made incorrect
answers to some of the questions. It can be assumed, although it does
not directly appear, that the agent denied that he was furnished in-
formation contrary to that appearing in the application. The trial
court had declined to direct a verdict and the jury found for the
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals approved the action of the trial judge
in not directing a verdict upon the grounds that there was ample evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that the applicant had informed
the agent of his past physical troubles and he had written wrong
answers in the application without the knowledge of the insured. The
court further found that there was no fraud or collusion between
the agent and the insured. The opinion makes no mention of the sign-
ing of the application by the insured, but it probably can be assumed
that had there been a departure from custom in this regard, it would
have been mentioned. In its apparent holding that there is no absolute
duty upon the applicant to ascertain and correct erroneous statements
in an application filled in by the agent, the decision is supported by
earlier Tennessee cases among them being Industrial Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Trinkle.3 7 Yet among the cases cited by the court is Beasley
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.3 8 which is difficult to reconcile with
the present case or with the holding in the Trinkle case. In the Beas-
ley case, the Supreme Court held that a verdict for the defendant
should have been directed at the conclusion of the plaintiff's proof
which was to the effect that the answers in the application completed
by the agent were false but that the applicant had given the agent
correct information and the applicant did not read the application after
it was completed, although he then signed it. The Beasley case men-
tioned the Trinkle case, but did not discuss or distinguish it; and it
appears that the principal case is more in line with the previous Ten-
nessee authorities than is the Beasley case.
37. 185 Tenn. 434, 206 S.W.2d 414 (1947).
38. 190 Tenn. 227, 229 S.W.2d 146 (1950).
[ VOL. 7
